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CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
more than a clarification of the meaning of § 1-282,25 in which case Rule
50 would not be an implicit declaration by the supreme court that § 1-282
is invalid as an infringement on the court's right to promulgate pro-
cedural rules for the appellate division.
As a word of warning to the practicing bar, it should be emphasized
that Rule 5 itself does not specifically authorize the trial court to enter
successive orders extending the time for docketing the case on appeal.
Possibly, then, a trial judge may have jurisdiction to issue only one
order extending the time for docketing the appeal. Thus, it may become
necessary for the supreme court to adopt a docketing rule, similar to
Rule 50, authorizing the trial judge to grant successive extensions of time
for docketing the appeal within the one hundred and fifty day limit of
Rule 5. Hopefully, in making future rulings on appellate procedure, the
new intermediate court will be less narrow in its view of the processes
of appeal and will accommodate its interpretation of the rules to the
practicalities involved.
ROBERT A. WICKER
Contracts-Contracts To Devise-Effect of Excluded Forced Heirs
A contract to make a will necessarily juxtaposes the law of contracts
and of decedent's estates and brings into conflict the policy of compelling
performance of a promise with that of allowing free testamentary disposi-
tion.' A recent case, In re Estate of Stewart,2 injected a third basic con-
sideration: the effect of an excluded forced heir upon the distribution of
property willed pursuant to an antenuptial contract to devise. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held the contract beneficiaries' interest paramount
to the forced heir's claim, thus upholding the policy for contractual cer-
tainty of performance against the challenge posed by the conflicting policy
disfavoring spousal disinheritance. The court's treatment of the problem
brings the factors involved sharply into focus.
In 1936, Walter Stewart, his wife Jennie, and his brother John, co-
tenants of specific real property, entered into a written contract to devise
See text accompanying notes 5 & 6, supra.
Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third
Parties, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 423 (1967); see generally, 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 963 (1965).
- Cal. 2d -, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
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their respective one-third interests in the property to the survivors for life
and to their respective children on the death of the last survivor.' Each
made a will pursuant to the contract.4 Upon John's death in 1947, Walter
and Jennie held as cotenants for life, with Walter, due to a lapse in John's
will, taking the remainder in John's one-third interest in fee.' When
Jennie died in 1949, Walter took her interest in the property for life,
and became vested with John's interest in fee simple. Walter subse-
quently remarried. When he died in 1965, his survivors included his
widow, a brother, and six stepchildren (Jennie's children by a previous
marriage). His estate consisted of the one-third interest in the realty
he owned in 1936 plus the one-third interest he inherited from his brother
John.' The widow was appointed administratrix, and the decedent's 1936
will was admitted to probate. As administratrix, the widow petitioned
for a decree determining interests in the decedent's estate.
The trial court found that, as a California statute7 revoked the will
as to the pretermitted spouse, Walter's widow took one-half of the
estate,8 with the remaining one-half passing under the will to the step-
children? The court of appeals"° determined that the contract was made
'Id. at -, 444 P.2d at 338, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
'Id. Walter left his interest to Jennie and John, or the survivor, remainder in
equal shares to his daughter, who predeceased him, and his six stepchildren.
' Ili re Estate of Stewart, 63 Cal. Rptr. 548 n.1 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Walter
and another brother, Sankey, were John's heirs, but for reasons undisclosed in the
record, Sankey did not share in the property. Hence Walter had a life estate in
cotenancy by virtue of John's will with a remainder in fee by intestate succession,
which, upon Jennie's subsequent death extinguishing the intervening life estate in
cotenancy, merged into a fee (the court's language is imprecise here).
' The remainder of Jennie's one-third interest passed to her six children (Wal-
ter's stepchildren) under her will when Walter died, and was not included as
part of Walter's probate estate.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). It provides that
[i]f a person marries after making a will, and the spouse survives the maker,
the will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has been made for the
spouse by marriage contract, or unless the spouse is provided for in the will,
or in such a way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such
provision ....
CAL. PROB. CODE § 23 (West 1956) provides that a mutual will may be revoked "in
like manner as any other will."
' CAL. PROB. CODE § 223 (West 1956) provides:
If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and no issue, the estate goes one-
half to the surviving spouse and one-half to the decedent's parents in equal
shares, or if either is dead to the survivor, or if both are dead to their issue
and the issue of either of them, by right of representation.9 Two supreme court justices would have affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 340, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 548.li re Estate of Stewart, 63 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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"expressly for the benefit" of the stepchildren as required by Civil Code
§ 1559," and reasoned that the decedent could not have effectively willed
the property to anyone except them,'2 thus reversing the trial court.
The California Supreme Court, however, vacated the decision of the
court of appeals,' 3 and held that the widow was entitled only to half of
that half of the estate that the decedent had inherited from his brother
John.
Although the decedent's post-testamentary marriage resulted in par-
tial revocation of the will, the supreme court stated that such revoca-
tion "does not impair the stepchildren's right to enforcement of the
contract, for such a partial revocation can no more prejudice their rights
than could a total revocation in repudiation of the contract." 4 The court
reasoned that since the decedent had received the benefits of the contract,
lie "became estopped from making any other or different disposition of
the property. . ," nor could he "avoid this estoppel ... by a subsequent
marriage. . . ,,'5 As the property belonged in equity to the stepchildren
the widow's right could attach only to property both legally and equitably
owned by the decedent, which was the one-third interest he had in-
herited from his brother John. This half of that interest, the court con-
cluded, is all she would have taken had the decedent died intestate; to
give her more when the decedent performed his contract than she would
have received had he breached it "would be anomalous."'
16
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have been confronted with
the problems involved in contracts to make mutual wills and have
resolved them upon widely disparate principles. That contracts to make
wills are valid and enforceable' 7 both in law'" and in equity' 9 seems well-
" CAL. CIv. CODE § 1559 (West 1954) secures third-party beneficiary rights.
See note 32 infra. The court of appeals cited with approval Brewer v. Simpson, 53
Cal. 2d 265, 349 P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1958), where remaindermen after a
similarly-created life estate were allowed to enjoin alienation by the life tenant.
" The court of appeals relied on Allen v. Payson, 170 Misc. 759, 11 N.Y.S.2d
28 (Sup. Ct. 1939). There, in construing a statute similar to CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 70 (West 1956), the court held that the statute did not affect enforceable con-
tracts, whether those seeking enforcement were creditors or cestni que trusts.
Bitt see note 58 infra, and accompanying text.
-. Cal. 2d -, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
1d. at -, 444 P.2d at 339, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
Id., quoting Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 55, 113 P.2d 495,
500 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
'0 - Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 340, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
"1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 10.1, at 432 (1960).
"E.g., Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 584, 147 P. 259, 263 (1915).
"E.g., Baylor v. Bath, 189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d 139 (1938).
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settled. But the time such contracts become enforceable and the extent
and manner in which they can be enforced are not so clear.
Generally, bilateral contracts are enforceable from the time a promise
is given in exchange and as consideration for another promise."0 Con-
tracts to make mutual wills, however, do not seem to be treated in
accordance with the rules governing ordinary bilateral contracts. Some
cases state that parties may repudiate without liability for breach of
contract while both are still living;"1 indeed, this has been said to be
the general rule.22 According to this view, the contract becomes binding
when, as in Stewart, one party dies with a will pursuant to the contract
in effect.2" If the survivor probates such a will and receives its benefits,
the surviving party is held estopped from repudiating his contract.2 4
The reason usually advanced to support the application of these prin-
ciples is that the privilege of free testamentary disposition should not be
subject to the usual rules of contract law. Enforceability of a contract
as of the time of creation might shackle the essentially ambulatory and
revocable attributes of wills. "Certainly, some freedom to change one's
mind is necessary for free intercourse between those who lack omnisci-
ence." 21 Conseqeuently, contract law attempts to balance between this
freedom to change one's mind and the interests of others that merit
protection." Such flexible principles of equity as mutual assent, con-
sideration, and fraud were developed to avoid undue harshness resulting
from compelling performance of a promise. Since future actions are
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 74, 77 (1932).
" [W]hile both or all of the parties to such an agreement are yet alive, any
party may recede therefrom, and revoke his will or make a different dis-
position ... on giving proper notice ... or where such other or others have
actual knowledge... provided such other is afforded an ample opportunity
to make a new will, and has not changed his position, to his detriment, in
reliance on the agreement.
97 C.J.S. Wills § 1367, at 306-07 (1957). As indicated, most courts require notice
of the revocation. E.g., Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909). For
a thorough analysis of this proposition, see Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts To
Devise or Bequeath Prior To the Death of the Promisor (pt. II), 53 MicH. L.
REv. 215, 222-31 (1954).
2 Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 52, 129 P.2d 813, 820 (1942).
'"But see Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P.2d 148 (1931), which sug-
gests that the contract is binding when the mutual wills are executed.
"
4E.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949). In somejurisdictions the contract may not be binding until that time. See Tooker v. Vree-
land, 92 N.J. Eq. 346, 112 A. 665 (Ch. 1921).
" Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 573 (1933).
"°See 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1963).
"' "The proposition that an agreement to make mutual wills is unenforceable
without estoppel, is perhaps the result of a latent dislike for the rule . . . that a
[Vol. 47
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naturally subject to change, as is a will, the power to break a contract
always exists; it is the right to do so without incurring liability that
contract law seeks to determine. This determination is guided by prin-
ciples sufficiently flexible to derive just results. The application of the
estoppel doctrine in the Stewart context seems an unnecessary importa-
tion; the contract should be enforced, if at all, on contract principles."8
While in Stewart the result is the same under either analysis, in cases
of a breached contract to make a will, the conclusion reached can vary
with the theory applied. The use of the estoppel doctrine rather than
normal contract rules to implement enforcement seems a deviation from
sound jurisprudence, the principal result of which is confusion. 9
The extent and manner of enforcement of contracts to make mutual
wills presents difficulty especially where, as in Stewart, third-party
beneficiaries seek enforcement. Third-party beneficiary rights are en-
forceable in most American jurisdictions," and are established in Cali-
fornia by both case law3' and statute.32 The theories upon which these
rights rest, however, are frequently disputed. 3 The court in Stewart
seems to regard equitable title to the property as vested in the remainder-
promise may serve as consideration for another promise." Note, Separation Agree-
ments to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
423, 439 (1967). "What logical justification is there for holding mutual promises
good consideration for each other? None, it submitted." Williston, Consideration
In Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L. Rxv. 503, 508 (1914) (quoting Pollock).
"[I]t is also true that whatever may be the requirements of sufficient consideration,
those requirements, like all rules of law, are in a broad sense dictated by public
policy." Id. at 504-05.
.8 "Our law has no separate concept of 'will made in pursuance of contract'; we
must treat the will part as a will and the contract part as a contract." T. ATKINSON,
WILLS 224 (2d ed. 1963). See B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS (1956)
[hereinafter cited as CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS].
" For a study of the evolution of estoppel doctrines to enforce contracts to make
wills in California, see Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for
the Benefit of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 425-27 (1967), where it is
asserted that the concept developed through error.
" Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (concerning a creditor-beneficiary),
is perhaps the leading case and is said to be the forerunner of third-party bene-
ficiary rights in the United States.
" The right to enforce such a contract to make a particular disposition of
property on death is not restricted to the promisee. Where two parties agree
to make mutual wills ... to [benefit] certain third persons ... the intended
devisees and legatees are entitled to enforce their rights as beneficiaries under
the agreement.
Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
82 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1559 (West 1954): "A contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
thereto rescind it."
" See Sparks, supra note 21.
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men prior to decedent's remarriage,34 and cites with approval cases treat-
ing the life tenant as a trustee for the remaindermen. 5 At the time the
contract was entered into, however, no present transfer of any interest
was intended; it was simply a promise to execute a document effectuating
such a transfer in the future. Perhaps a more accurate statement is
that the equitable title vests at the time of the promisor's death, subject
to funeral and administrative expenses.3" The closest analogy is said
to be that to a contract to sell at a future date.3" "Hence the beneficiary
has an equitable right to demand a conveyance or transfer at [death]
• . . , but does not have equitable title."3 The distinction is important
where the subject of the contract is "all my estate" or some other in-
definite quantity;30 fortunately, the imprecision here, where specific realty
was concerned, was not fatal to correct adjudication.
The difficulties inherent in a contract to make mutual wills are
sharply compounded when the policies underlying its enforcement are
confronted with a contest by a pretermitted spouse.40 "[T]he rights of
the wife and widow [are] vested under a contract most strongly favored
by the law . .,' and the tendency of courts to give spousal rights prefer-
- Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 339, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
' Id. Several cases cited therein rely on "constructive trust" theories to en-
force breached contracts to make mutual wills. Blit see Sparks, supra note 21, at
215.
"'In re Stevens' Will, 192 Misc. 179, 183, 78 N.Y.S.2d 868, 872 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts To Devise or Bequeath Prior To the Death
of the Promisor (pt. I), 53 MicH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1954); Sparks, supra note 21,
at 219.
" Sparks, supra note 21, at -. This view also avoids "the technical responsi-
bilities attaching to life tenancies with frequent accounting to the probate court.
Meador v. Manlove, 97 Kan. 706, 711, 156 P. 731, 733 (1916).
" This theory creates very serious difficulties in case of contracts to will all
or a fractional part of one's estate. What is there to have a life estate in and
in what does the promisee have a remainder? The promisor may consume
any or all of his property during his life or he may exchange any or all of
it . . . . Even it is explained that the life estate is a life estate with the
power to consume, there is the further difficulty of explaining how the
future acquired property is brought within the life tenant-remainderman
status. It is difficult to conceive of a relationship wherein one party owns a
life estate in everything possessed by him and another owns the remainder
in fee, but the life tenant is capable of disposing of any or all of the prop-
erty in fee simple, and any future property coming to him immediately
assumes the status of a mere life estate in him and a remainder in the other
party. Not only would this be a new and unusual estate, but it would be a
new and unusual estate which served no useful purpose.
Sparks, supra note 21, at 218-19. See CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 106.
"°See CONTRACTS TO MAXE WILLS 167-78.
"Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 453, 45 P. 710, 713 (1896).
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ential treatment increases the complexity of an already complicated area
of the law. Furthermore, manifestation of the deference accorded sur-
viving spouses excluded from testamentary disposition is to be noted
in various state statutes giving such spouses rights of dissent from their
decedent spouses' excluding wills." Most states provide for some extent
of revocation, by operation of law, of wills executed prior to marriage.4"
This legislation has recognized one or a combination of four types
of such revocation. 4 4 A subsequent marriage may be deemed to revoke the
will absolutely,45 or merely partially revoke it, giving the surviving
spouse an intestate share.4" Or the statute may revoke the will unless it
was executed in contemplation of the marriage,47 or revoke except when
a marriage contract or other arrangement provides for the surviving
spouse or the spouse is so mentioned in the will as to indicate an intention
that the will not be revoked by marriage.4 These statutes reflect varying
legislative appraisals of the extent to which marital rights should out-
weigh the privilege of free testamentary disposition.
Judicial efforts to balance the interests of excluded surviving spouses
and those of the beneficiaries of the decedent's bounty in another area,
inter vivos alienation of property to avoid the claims of the surviving
spouse,40 may also prove helpful by analogy, as the policies involved are
similar to those considered in Stewart. The courts have taken various
approaches to reconciling such conflicts. Perhaps these might be outlined
as the "fraud" approach or New York rule,"0 the "balancing of hard-
"2 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1, -3 (1966) (right of dissent); id. § 29-30
(election of life estate or "statutory dower").
" For an annotation of state legislation in this area, see 95 C.J.S. Wills § 291
(1957).
" See Note, Wills-Partial Revocation For the Benefit of a Pretermitted Spouse,
17 U. MIAMi L. REV. 229 (1962).
" E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 197 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 114.130 (1965).
A statute, unless expressly so providing, will not be construed to allow partial revo-
cation; rather, the will will be struck down in its entirety. In re Tenner's Will,
248 N.C. 72, 102 S.E.2d 391 (1958).
"E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra. Some statutes,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, -3 (1966), accomplish the same result by providing
for dissent from the will by the surviving spouse, rather than for partial revocation.
"'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-162 (1958).
"E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra.
" These efforts have focused particularly on cases where a spouse, to avoid
leaving a substantial estate to his surviving spouse, has established revocable and
tentative ("Totten") trusts with rights of survivorship in third parties.
"See In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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ships" approach or Maryland rule,51 and the "estate inclusion" approach
taken by the Restatement of Trusts, 2 in which the value of the inter
vivos transfer is included in the decedent's estate for the purpose of
determining the surviving spouse's forced heir's share, but is subjected
to that obligation only if necessary and only to the extent necessary to
satisfy it.5 3 While these considerations in an area involving similar
conflicts to those found in Stewart bear some relevance to that determina-
tion, their application is limited. All to some degree give weight to the
decedent's intention or lack of intention to defraud the surviving spouse's
marital rights.54 Where, as in Stewart, the decedent in good faith con-
tracts several years prior to the marriage, and indeed contracts with his
then spouse, any application of policies based on fraudulent intent is
clearly incorrect.
The status of the contesting parties is relevant, 5 but here hardly
determinative. The widow was not mentioned in the will, a circum-
stance in which California legislation 6 seems to presume an oversight
by the decedent, rather than an intention to exclude her. In her pre-
termitted status, then, the widow would seem deserving of judicial in-
dulgence. Her status, however, as a second wife who did not jointly
contribute to the acquisition of the property in question tends to nullify
this consideration.57 Whether the status of the contract beneficiaries
entitles them to more protection is also questionable. As donee-bene-
ficiaries, they gave "no consideration in the past, [give] none in the
" See Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1954).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment e, at 157-58 (1959).
"' These various approaches were compared in Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183,
130 N.W.2d 473 (1964), noted in 34 U. CIN. L. R-v. 179 (1965). The court, criti-
cizing the New York rule as inequitable and the Maryland rule as uncertain, con-
cluded that the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS approach was the most satisfactory. Id.
at 196, 130 N.W.2d at 481. See generally B. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 (2d
ed. 1965); 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 569-71 (1949); A. SCOTT, LAW OF
TRUSTS § 58 (3d ed. 1967); Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.L.
REV. 214 (1963).
" Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) rejects such a sub-jective test and implements a "real or illusory nature of the transfer" test instead;
but this would seem to be merely one of a number of means of ascertaining the
presence of fraudulent intent.
" See Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
" CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra.
"'For a legislative manifestation of this view, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b)(1966) (giving second or successive surviving spouse dissenting from a will only
one-half the amount otherwise provided as a forced heir's share by the Intestate
Succession Act where the decedent has lineal descendants by a former marriage
surviving, but none surviving the second or successive marriage).
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present, and [promise] nothing for the future." ' s Although they are
stepchildren of the decedent, he seemed by his contract and will to be
disposed to treat them as his children. The decedent's intent seems on
balance to have been that the property go to the stepchildren, but when
the widow is taking under a forced heir's statute, this intent is clearly
not entitled to much weight. Other factors entitled to judicial considera-
tion in a given case 9 might include the length of the marriage, the
widow's age and ability to support herself, and the quantum of inter
vivos gifts given to her by the decedent spouse. Evidence of such factors,
however, is lacking in this case.
Correct distribution of the estate involved in Stewart thus requires
a balancing of the policy of protecting the widow from destitution
against the policy of upholding the certainty of contractual obligation,
and this balancing must control the decision almost to the exclusion of
other factors. This approach, rather than a formal application of real
property theory, should be accepted. "[O]nly those economic advan-
tages are 'rights' which have the law back of them ... [w]hether it is
a property right is really the question to be answered."6 That such a
decision, in the absence of legislation on the point, should appropriately
rest in equity jurisdiction has long been accepted. It is submitted that
in the absence of a showing of hardship by the pretermitted spouse the
contractual obligation should hold sway."
DAVID G. CROCKETT
58 Page, The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract For Render-
ing Performance to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. REv. 141, 184 (1937). Although
the California statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 1954) (set out at note 32 supra),
does not distinguish between donee-beneficiaries and creditor-beneficiaries, Cali-
fornia courts have noted the distinction. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co.,
204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 751-52, 22 Cal. Rptr. 540, 543-44 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
" See Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
" United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945)
(opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson). It is asserted that the property theory has been
consistently applied by the Court: "It is incorrect to say that the judiciary pro-
tected property; rather they called that property to which they accorded protec-
ion." Hamilton & Till, Property, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
528, 536 (1934).
"1 While the arguments on both sides are cogent, it is submitted that it is better
to permit a person to disinherit his future spouse than to break his contract.
Hirsch, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath (pt. II), 9 Wis. L. REv. 388, 391 (1934);
see Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y.S. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Burdine v.
Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900); but see Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
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